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Real Exchange Rates: Some
Evidencefrom the Postwar Years
HE MOVE TO FLEXIBLE EXCFIANGE RATES
early in 1973 is the type of experiment that
economic researchers experience rarely. A marked
change in monetary regime from fixed to flexible
rates was followed by years of floating rates.
Initially, some governments may have thought of
flexible rates as a temporary expedient to last only
until new parities were firmly established. WiUin
a few years, however, the governments of prin-
cipal developed countries, including the United
States accepted flexible rates as a durable arrange-
ment. Although there has been considerable inter-
vention in the currency markets, attempts at
policy coordination and talk about target zones
(particularly in recent years), the dollar and sev-
eral other currencies have continued to float.
Most major trading countries have reduced or
removed exchange controls and other restric-
ions on capital mobility.
A frequent, and probably the dominant, assess-
ment of experience with flexible rates is that they
have riot worked as anticipated. Robert Aliher
(1992, p. 44) writes that Few of the advantages
noted by proponents of floating exchange rates
have been realized in the 1970s and the 1980s.”
Krugman and Miller (1992, p. i) share this view
and, in addition, criticize theories of exchange
rate determination. They write that “interventionist
economists believed that left to themselves
exchange markets would introduce unnecessary
and harmful volatility into the exchange rate.”
These writers summarize the current state of
research as showing that monetary models
“have had almost no empirical success. Indeed,
money supplies, if they enter at all, typically
enter with the wrong sign.” (ibid, p. 9)
Singleton (1987, p. 9) reports the professional
judgment that “by most measures, exchange rates
have been relatively unstable since 1973.” He re-
cognizes, however, that the instability may reflect
uncertainty that the public faces in adjusting to
information about the Future. And he notes that
observed variability of exchange rates may have
lower welfare costs than alternative regimes.
Mussa (1986) studied fluctuations in bilateral
exchange rates for the principal market econo-
mies. He showed that the variability of bilateral
real exchange rates from 1957 to 1984 was eight
to 80 times higher in flexible-rate periods. There
were no examples of lower variability under flex-
ible rates among the 17 countries studied. The
reason is clear from Mussa’s data. Under flexi-
ble exchange rates the variability of nominal
exchange rates increases much more than the
variability of the ratio of relative price levels
declines. In fact, the variance of bilateral rela-
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tive pricelevels was not always lower in flexible-
rate regimes.
Mussa did not draw any conclusion about the
welfare properties of alternative regimes. The
increased variance of bilateral real exchange
rates may substitute for the variance of other
variables, may be absorbed at relatively low
cost by hedgers and speculators in financial
markets, or in partmay represent permanent
shocks, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s and
1980s, that require adjustment of relative prices
and real values. But the alternative is also plau-
sible. Some of the higher variances under fluc-
tuating rates may be the source of excess burden.
A main problem in reaching a judgment about
the operation of fluctuating rates is that there is
no benchmark for comparing alternative regimes.
Economic models of exchange rates have per-
formed poorly compared with statistical models
such as therandom walk.Many papers report that
there is no significantrelation, often no evidence
of any reliable relation, between exchange rates
and other economic variables. Meese and RogofPs
(1983) well-known paper found that a random
walk performed as well out of sample as any
estimated structural model. This suggests that
many changes in exchange rates are random
events, unrelated to policy or macroeconomic
performance. Chinn (1991) summarizes recent
tests for cointegration of real and nominal ex-
change rates with standard economic aggregates
such as money and output at home and abroad
or, for nominal exchange rates, relative rates of
inflation. The tests reject cointegration, suggest-
ing that there is no long run relationship between
exchange rates and any of these aggregates.
Critics have commented especially on the rela-
tively large change in dollar exchange rates in
the 1980s. Even Haberler (1987), a long-time
proponent of floating refers to “the widespread
disenchantment with floating exchange rates-”
Critics have not been satisfied with computa-
tions showing that the variances of exchange
rates, like the prices of other traded assets,
exceed the variances of prices of current pro-
duction. Nor have they accepted as sufficient
explanation for observed variability that foreign
exchange markets, like other markets for traded
assets,respond to newinformation, which arrives
continuously in a changing world.l Without
evidence showing that the news is systemati-
cally linked to exchange rate changes and that
the adjustments are toward a new equilibrium,
the proposition is nearly empty.2
A longer summary of the large literature on
flexible rates would belabor the obvious. Neither
thecriticsnorthe proponentsofflexible exchange
rates have produced much evidence on which
to base comparative judgments about exchange
rate regimes- Claims that variability is larger or
too large are meaningless unless an alternative
is specified and its properties compared. Yet it
is common to find statements that flexible rates
have not worked as expected. They “do not sub-
stantially shield a country from events abroad”;
that “current account imbalances have been pro-
tracted”, and that “wide movement and reversals
have contributed to the widespread impression
that floating rates tend to overshoot.” “Although
clean floating has not yet become a dirty word,
the simple faith that the market is always right
has been shaken.”~
This paperreconsiders experience under flexible
exchange rates. Section 1 summarizes the claims
about flexible rates in Milton Friedman’s classic
1953 paper to show that Friedman’s claims are
more modest than is often supposed. Section 2
presents some key facts about exchange rates
and comparativevariability of several variables
under fixed and flexible rates. Section 3 esti-
mates a model of the so-called real exchange
rate under Bretton Woods and flexible rates
and tests for the effect of economic aggregates
on the exchange rate. The model incorporates
some of the principal variables affectingexchange
rates suggested byFriedman. Section 4 discusses
some limitations of the results. A conclusion
completes the paper.
FRIEDMAN’S CASE FOR FLEXIBLE
EXCHANGE RATES
In ‘The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,”
written shortly after the Bretton Woods System
started, Friedman claims four benefits for flexi-
ble rates: (1) increased liberalization of trade, (2)
avoidance of direct controls, (3) facilitation of
‘See Frenkel (1983).
tThe qualiftcatlonis needed because some testable proposi-
tions result. Changes may be unbiasedor larger inpe~iods
of large shocks such aswars and oil price changes.
3See Waflich (1984).
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rearmament, and (4) harmonization of internal
monetary and fiscal policies.-’ The point that
concerned later critics most, variabifity or insta•
bility, is dismissed early with the claim that
exchange rate instability reflects instability in
the economy and is not a property of a flexible
or floating rate system. This claim is not self-
evident, and it has not been accepted by the
principal critics of flexible rates. Friedman
appears to have anticipated this outcome. He
devotes more space to refutingor dismissing
the charge of instability than to making the
positive case for the four benefits claimed for
flexible rates.
Friedman’s essay does not claim that flexible
exchange rates are optimal for all countries or
even for a single country. When discussing the
former sterling bloc, he considers a mixed sys-
tem in which groups of countries may elect to
maintain fixed exchange rates internally and
flexible rates against all other groups or coun-
tries. Although there are structural differences
between the sterling bloc and the proposed
European Monetary Union, Friedman anticipates
the principal issues: policy harmonization, avoid’
ance of trade controls and exchange restrictions,
absence of a politicalauthority and, in the absence
of controls, the need to choose between unem-
ployment and exchange ratechanges in the
short term.
Recognizing thatoptimality of flexible rates can-
not be established, Friedman limits his claim to the
judgment that flexible exchange rates are more
desirable socially than the four alternative means
of offsetting changes in international position.
The four alternatives are: (1) official changes in
currency reserves; (2) changes in domestic price
levels and incomes; (3) periodic realignment of
parities; and (4) direct controls.
The key conditionsare posited. First, withflexi-
ble exchange rates, there are “broad, active, and
nearly perfect markets ... in foreign exchange”
whenever they are permitted. Second, a fixed
but adjustable exchange rate“insures a maxirn
mum of destabilizing speculation- Because the
exchange rate is changed infrequently and only
to meet substantial difficulties, a change tends
to come well after the onset of difficulty, to be
postponed as long as possible.”5 These condi.
tions, it seems fairto say, have notbeen accepted
by the critics of flexible rates. The critics typi-
cally argue thatspeculation is (or can be)
destabilizing.
Friedman considers and rejects some common
conjectures about destabilizing speculation. His
main argument is that there is no empirical
foundation for these claims. Appearances to the
contrary are misleading and subject to misin-
terpretation. A main problem in any study is to
separate the actions of speculators based on
correct predictions of parity changes and actions
that cause parity changes that would have been
avoided. These problemsarise under an adjustable
peg, but Friedman claimsthey would be prevented
under continuous adjustment of flexible rates.
Friedman is cautious, however. He avoidsa gen-
eral claim that speculation is stabilizing. Instead,
he argues that if destabilizing speculation is com-
mon, governments (orexchange stabilization funds)
would profit by intervening. And he recognizes
that governments may have more information
or more timely information that gives them an
advantage over private speculators. He is willing
to let a government agency intervene to smooth
temporary fluctuations if they can do so profita-
bly (p. 188), but he is skeptical that they would
be able to profit consistently. They are less likely
to profit, he claims, than private speculators who
risk their own wealth.
The reason for choosing flexible rates is that
other meansof adjustment are less satisfactory.
Fixed exchange rates were maintained in the
19th century because the public and govern-
ments tolerated larger fluctuations in domestic
prices and employment than would be accepta-
ble in the late 20th century. Direct controls are
least satisfactory because they introduce distor.
tions anddo not correct permanent differencesin
relative prices in foreign and domestic markets.
Timing of adjustments is a source of variabil-
ity about which little is known with precision.
Anticipating future discussion, Friedman con-
siders overshooting and undershootingof ex-
change rates. Overshooting arises because initial
adjustment is borne by prices that adjust most
readily. The exchange rate is such a price. Later
other prices adjust, and theovershooting reverses,
although it may be replaced by undershooting
of the fmal change, followed by a series of ad-
justments around the new equilibrium.
‘The essay was written in 1950 but not published until 1953.
5See Friedman (1953), pp. 162.64.
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Thus Friedman recognizes that there will be
variability and fluctuations of exchange rates,
not prompt, rapid adjustment from the old to
the new equ i hriurn. The possibility that the
fluctuations, though not destabilizing, produce
excess burden and welfare loss is not addressed
directly. Friedman’s main response to this central
issue is comparative. His conclusion can be sum-
marized in I ~~‘oparagraphs.
First, comparison of exchange rate regimes
must include the costs of adjustment under
alternative policies. The comparison cannot be
limited to the size of changes in exchange rates
or the variability of exchange rates under dif-
ferent regimes. Changes in the relative prices of
goods and services are not the same under dif-
ferent policies With gradual adjustment of real
wages and other relative prices, labor market
adjustment, hence unemployment rates, will dif-
fer under different regimes. And direct controls
inti-oduce distortions and welfare losses.
Second, there is no presumption that socialcosts
could not be increased by flexible exchange
rates. About all one can say ... is that there
seems no reason to expect the timing or pace of
adjustment under the assumed conditions [flexi-
ble exchange ratesi to be systematically biased
in one direction or the other from the optimum
or to expect that other techniques of adaptation—
through internal price changes, direct controls,
and the use of monetary reserves with rigid ex-
change rates—would lead to a more nearly opti-
mum pace and timing of adjustment.’5
EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES AND
VARIABILITY, 1973—90
Excessive variability is one of the main issues
raised by the critics of flexible rates. Evidence
of increased variability of real or nominal cx-
change rates after 1973 is easy to produce. To
draw any conclusion about the effects on wel-
fare, two issues must be resolved. First, as
Friedman noted, increased variability of exchange
rates max’ reduce variabihtv of output, con-
sumption, employment or other variables of
interest to consumers. Reduced variability of
these variables can produce a welfare gain
despite the increased variability of exchange
rates. Second, increased variability of exchange
rates may result froni real shocks, such as an
oil shock, or from policy activism, or it may
reflect increased knowledge of the operation of
exchange markets.
This section considers changes and variability
of exchange rates and some other variables under
Bretton Woods and flexible rates. Figure 1 shows
the monthly trade-weighted nominal and real ex-
change rate for the United States, using Federal
Reserve weights, for the period 1973—90. A rise
in the index is an appreciation of the dollar. Two
facts are immediately apparent. First, real and
nominal exchange rates move together and by
similar amounts.7 This fact has been demonstrated
repeatedly for bilateral rates. See Mussa (1986)
and Edwards (1989) for studies of developed
and developing countries. Second, trade-weighted
exchange rates moved over a relatively wide
range during the 18-year period. The movement
is dominated by a persistent appreciation from
1980 to 1985 followed by a persistent deprecia-
tion lasting to early 1987. Both exchange rates
then returned to approximately the same range
they had left in 1979.
Other measures of trade-weighted exchange
rates developed by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) using wholesale prices or unit labor
costs in the various countries to compute real
exchange rates show the same general pattern.
Experiments with different weighing patterns
°SeeFriedman (1953). The conflicts in the system devel-
oped more slowly than Friedman predicted. He predicted
that direct controls over exports and imports would be
reimposed on a large scale within two or three years at
the most.” This prediction was inaccurate. The United
States introduced some controls on capital movements in
the 1960s, but the trend in the 1950s and 1960s was
toward reduction of trade barriers under General Agree-
ment on Taritts and Trade rules. The conflicts in the sys-
tem were resolved partly by changes in parities abroad but
mainly by intlation in the 1960s and early 1970s.
7The so-called real exchange rate measures the ratio of the
price level in the United States to a weighted average of
foreign price levels expressed in a common currency.
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Figure 1













Monthly 1973:1 to 1990:12
do not appear- to change the gener-al features,
although computed variances and ranges differ
for- the individual measures.8
The exchange rate data shown in figure 1 raise
two issues that will concern us. First, why do
r-eal and nominal exchange rates move together?
Second, is the higher- variability of real exchange
rates under fluctuating exchange rates caused
by policy actions, or is there evidence of excess
burden arising froni increased variability unrelated
to policy action?
The similarity of real and nominal exchange
rate changes in figure 1 is not peculiar to [iS.
data. Figure 2 shows monthly values of the ex-
change rate of the Japanese yen for the German
mark during the period 1973—90. The real ex-
change rate is obtained using the relative con-
sumer price indexes for the two countries. In
the first years, the real and nominal exchange
rates differ; consumer prices rose more rapidly
in Japan than in Germany. In real terms Japan
paid more yen per mark than in noniinal terms.
After 1976, the two price levels had about the
same i-ate of change, so the real and nominal
exchange rates are often indistinguishable on
figure 2.
Mussa’s (1986) stud of changes in bilateral
exchange rates for a bi-oad sample of developed
countries during the years 1957—1984 found the
same result. Under flexible exchange rates, changes
in nominal and real exchange rates are highly
correlated, but changes in nominal or real ex-
change rates ~u’enot closel correlated with
changes in the ratio of price index numbers.
‘Becketti and Hakkio (1989) computed the correlation
between innovations in seven alternative measures of
trade-weighted exchange rates. Most of the correlations
are above 0.9 using quarterly data for 1976 to 1988. They
show that similar results hold for percentage rates of
change of exchange rates.
The Federal Reserve index uses weights reflecting country
shares of world trade. Icomputed an alternative index
based on US- trade weights and reweighted the index at
the start of each decade-1960, 1970 and 1980-to adjust for
changes in relative trade shares. The main conclusion
sensitive to the change in weights is that the variance of
the trade-weighted real exchange rate is lower for the
alternative measure. I have used the Federal Reserve
index throughout.
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Figure 2
Real and Nominal Yen/DM Exchange Rates
Monthly 1973:1 to 1990:12
Meltzer (1990) considered the variability of
multilateral exchange rates using data from the
IMF. Real exchange rates are based on both
relative wholesale prices and relative unit labor
costs, and variances are used to measure ~‘aria-
bilitv. Again, countries with flexible exchange
rates had greater variability of nominal and real
exchange rates than countries in the European
Monetary System (EMSI that maintained an ad-
justable peg with other members of the EMS.
Changes in real and nominal exchange rates
were highly correlated under flexible rates. How-
ever, the variability of relative unit labor costs
was typically lowet- in the countries with flexi-
ble exchange r-ates, whereas the variability of
wholesale price ratios was higher.
‘I’able I summarizes these data. Both nominal
(N) and real (H) exchange rate changes are more
vat-iable undei- liexible exchange rates than under
fixed hut adjustable rates, whereas relative prices
are not. The variability of H or N under flexible
rates is significantly different at the 1 percent
level from the variability experienced under
EMS or the mixed regimes (denoted other) that
had crawling pegs or- some other type of par-
tially fixed nominal exchange rate during this
period. Changes in multilateral real exchange
rates are 4 or S times more variable in flexible-
rate countries than in the EMS. Generally, the
variances for’ other” countries lie between the
variances for the EMS and flexible-rate coun-
tries. The exception is ? ,~,the variability of
changes in relative prices based on unit labor
costs, l~, has been lower on average under
flexible rates, although the difference between
regimes is not significant by the usual standards.
The much-discussed increase ill the variability
of meal exchange rates in a flexible exchange rate
regime max’ reflect only that flexible exchange
rates change more frequently, whereas the rela-
tive price ratios are not much affected by the
change in regime. Using the terms of trade as a
measure of relative prices, table 2 shows that
the variances of relative price ratios do not dif-
fer systematically across exchange rate regimes.
Variability of the terms of trade rose in all coun-
tries hut to different degrees unrelated to the
exchange rate regime. The comparatively high
variability of Japan’s terms of trade suggests
that there is no simple relation between the
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Table 2 also compares real output variances
under fixed and flexible exchange rates in four
countries. There is no relation between the rela-
tive variances and the monetary system. Heal
ouput variability declined in the same propor-
tion in Germany and Japan with (mainly) fixed
and flexible rates respectively and rose moder-
ately in the United States arid the tinitedKingdom.~
The last four lines of the table show variances
for subperiods. The oil shocks of the 1970s in-
creased the variances in table 2 in the early
years of flexible rates. Variability of output fell
in the United States in each successive period.
In all countries the variance of i-cal GDP was
lower in 1987—91 than under the Bretton
Woods regime.
tMeltzer (1986) reports similar results for the four countries
using unanticipated variances. Unanticipated variances
were computed using forecasts obtained from a multistate,
univariate Kalman filter.
N ‘~N, j’” ~~ ~~ // N/ /,NN’/..N’N, ~N’~~N/,~NN ~NNNN~N/N~: \
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The countries shown in table 2 have different
exchange rate systems. Japan and the United
Kingdom had flexible exchange rates during the
pet-iod, although the United Kingdom fixed to
the exchange rate mechanism (ERN’l) of the EMS
at the end of the period. Ger-mnany has been in
the fixed-hut-adjustable-rate ERM system since
March 1979, arid it experimented with other
fixed-but-adjustable-rate systems with its neigh-
bors beginning in the mid-1970s. The mark fluc-
tuated, however, against the dollar, yen and
many othel currencies.
Though the variability of Germany’s output
growth is, on average, lowest of the countiies
in table 2, this cannot be attributed entirely to
the reliance on fixed-but-adjustable rates. ~‘aria-
bility of output growth in Germany was also
lower than in Japan or the United Kingdom
during the Bretton Woods period, and the rela-
tive decline in variability is the same for Ger-
many and Japan. Further, during 1975-80 and
1980—87, per-iods of declining inflation, variabil-
ity of Japan’s output growth is comparable to
(and even slightly below) Germany’s.
The main conclusion drawn from table 2 is
that ther-e is rio basis for a general pr-oposition
that output is mor-e variable under fixed rates
than under flexible rates. Relative prices (terms
of trade) are more variable in all countries after
1973, but the increase is smallest in the United
Kingdom.
POLICIES AND REAL EXCHANGE
RATES
Friedman (1953) made two suggestions that
have been overlooked. He gave prominence to
policy—particularly rearmnament—as one of the
main factors affecting U.S. real exchange rates.
Rearmament changes relative pt-ices and the bal-
ance of payments (Friedman, pp. 159—60). Also,
Friedman distinguished permanent and transi-
tory changes in exchange iates. He noted the
differ-ent response of speculators to changes
that were expected to reverse and those that
were expected to persist.’°
Real gover-nment spending for- defense rose
arid fell during the postwar years. Spending
rose during the Vietnam War and declined dur-
ing the 1970s both absolutely and relative to
real output. Spending rose again in the 1980s,
ieached a peak in the mid-1980s arid declined
modestly to the end of the decade. Maintained
changes in the level of real defense spending
act like any fiscal change. Increases in real
defense spending raise aggregate spending and
interest rates. Higher interest rates attract a
capital inflow, appreciating the exchange rate.
In the absence of capital controls and restric-
tions, the capital inflow reverses the iise in the
interest i-ate. Reductions in real defense spend-
ing have the opposite effects” The sign of real
defense spending per unit of output should be
positive.
Real money balances also affect real exchange
rates. Injections of money ten por-arily increase
real balances, and if the price level does not
adjust instantly, the increase in money depmeci-
ates the i-cal exchange rate. Reductions in real
balances brought about by reductions in money
or by a rise in prices for a given quantity of
money appreciate the exchange rate.
Let r, the i-cal exchange rate, have a perma-
nent and transitom-y component, so that
(I) r,=F,+u,
whet-c F, is the permanent component and u, is
the transitory disturbance. In the absence of
changes in defense spending, real U.S. money
balances and foreign real balances, the expected
value of the exchange rate is the permanent
value. The current permanent value is a weighted
average of last period’s exchange rate and any
persistent effect of defense spending (relative to
GDP) and real money balances at horue and abroad
as shown in equation (2).
(2) F, = ar , + (1 — a) f(d~m,,m) + v,,
Combining equations (1) and (2) gives equation
(3). a testable equation for the real exchange i-ate.
(3) r,=ar, +0—a) Jid,,m~rn~+ E,
where c, has the usual pi-opet-ties.
If the real exchange rate is mainly a random
walk, i- i’, plus a transitory white noise term.
‘°SeeFriedman (1953, p. 162). I began work on the relation of
permanent and transitory fiscal and monetary changes to
real exchange rates before I reread Friedman’sessay. I was
pleased to find that the results I had obtained provided
evidence on some of his principal propositions.
“Defense spending is a large share of government spend-
ing on goods and services. It has the advantage of being
independent of income and hence a good measure of the
thrust of exogenous fiscal policy. It also permits a test of
Friedman’s proposition.
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But if monetar and fiscal actions have persist-
ent effects, these effects will be found signifi-
cant in estimates of equation (3). Equation (3)
therefore permits a test of the influence of the
defense spending share arid real money bal-
ances against the alternative hypothesis that real
exchange rates are approximately a random walk
and independent of systematic monetary and
fiscal effects. If the real exchange rate is mainly
a random walk, a is close to one. If there are
persistent and systematic effects of money arid
the defense spending share, current values of
these variables will have a significant effect on
the i-cal exchange rate.
ihe first t~vo columns of table 3 show estimates
for 1962—91 and 1972—91 based on annual data;
the former- includes the fixed exchange rate period,
‘•~‘hereasthe latter does not. The two sets of
estimates are similar. The standard errors of
estimate for the two equations are 5.9 and 6.8,
a difference of appt-oximatelv 1 percent of the
mean value of the real exchange rate. The implied
standard etior of estimate for the Bretton Woods
period is 3.6, about half the value for the flexi-
ble t-ate period]. These values suggest that transi-
tory random va -iation increased under’ flexible
rates, but the increase is much smaller than is
commonly alleged. A main reason is that the
estimates het-e remove the effects of permanent
changes in in, iii * , and dl. These variables, par-
ticularly i-cal money balances, have significant
effects on the trade-weighted real exchange rate.
One problem with these estimates is that the
coefficient of m~is much larger than the coeffi-
cient of m, using annual data. The difference may
not be meaningful, however. The definitions of
money differ (as described in the Appendix), and
the difference in coefficients is not significant.
Figure 3 shows the actual and predicted val-
ues of table 3 using equation (1). Many of the
claims about exchange rate instability are based
on the relative changes in the 1980s. The chat-t
suggests that much of the swing in the trade-
weighted real exchange rate during the 1980s is
driven by the variables in the model. The defense
spending share rose by more than a percentage
IJoint in the early 1 980s then fell after the mid-
dIe of the decade. Real money balances moved
in the opposite direction, falling through 1982,
then rising, particularly in 1985 and 1986. The
forecasts and actual values are extremely close
for 1981—83. ‘l’here is sonic evidence of over-
shooting by the actual rate in 1984-85, but the
errors are not much larger than the staridaid
et-ror of estimate. The subsequent decline in the
forecast value lags the actual declme, however,
in 1986 and 1987. The largest error in the
29-year span is in 1986.
The third column in table 3 shifts the time
inter-val from annual to quar-terlv data. The
results at-c similar to the annual data except
that m,* is no longer significant. Current real
morie balances remain significant at the usual
level, and the defense spending share nearly so.
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Figure 3
Trade Weighted Real Exchange Rate
The dependent variable in the regressions
reported in the first and thind columns of fig-
ure 3 is the. aver-age trade-weighted real exchange
for- the p~~’~~1- The fourth and fifth columns
repeat the regressions for annual data using the
nionthlv average value for December as the de-
penrlent variable. The tesults are similan-.
The estimates in table 3 permit a test of the
unit coefficient on HER,, implied by the random-
walk hypothesis. All of the estimates are below
unity, but two are not significantly different
fi’rnn unity; these are in) the first and second
columns of table 3. The estimates in the third
and fifth columns differ from unity by more
than two standard errors, so they reject this
central implication of the random walk.
Recent work on the causes of fluctuations em-
phasizes the impor-tance of i-cal shocks to aggre-
gate supply as a cause of fluctuations. ‘l’he effects
on the real exchange n-ate of the rise and fall of
the relative price of oil in the 1970s and 1980s
is an obvious candidate for investigation. The
i-dative price of oil can be included in equation
(2) as an additional variahle affecting the pet-ma-
rient component of the real exchange n-ate. Annual
data for 1972—90 and 1962—90 reject the effect;
the coefficient of the relative oil pr-ice is small
— 0.03) in each IJeriodi and has a standard error
larger than the estimated coefficient.
The use of real money balances combines the
separate effects of money and prices. To sepa-
rate the effect of policy actions from the effects
of prices, I first differentiate ni = (M,/p) then




The first term is the real value (in past prices)
of the curt-ent change in nominal balances. ‘Ibm
second is the revenue from the inflation tax on
last period’s n-cal nnoney balances. To estimate
responses to these variables, I take first differ-
ences of equation (3) using equation (4) to re-
place dm,.
Table 4 shows estimates relating the annual
change in the i-cal exchange n-ate to changes in
some policy variables and real shocks. I have
omitted the change in m * to conserve a dlegree
of freedotn. Am* typically has a small negative
coefficient and is not significant. Changes in
money and changes in defense spending relative
Index (1973:3=100)
1.
1962 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 1990
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to GDP have considerable effect For example a
0.1 percentage point change in the share of
defense spending changes the real exchange
rate between 1.4 percentage points and 2.4 per-
centage points based on the two equations. The
1982 increase in defense spending alone appre-
ciated the dollar by 8.7 percentage points using
the coefficient estimate for 1972_89.12
The inflation tax is not significant in the re-
gression or in alternative estimates. This is un-
satisfactory. Without a significant response to
inflation, the equations imply that a change in
nominal money has a permanent effect on the
real exchange mate. lf the equations are inter-
preted as short-teimii responses, they leave an
important part of the dynamics unspecified.
Much recent discussion of the appreciation of
the real exchange rate in the early 1980s, fol-
lowing the Reagan tax cuts, linked the apprecia-
tion either to the budget deficit or to the increased
after-tax return to real capital. The change in
the real valtie of government debt measures the
part of the cut-rent fedleral budget deficit financed
by tJoi-rowing. I usedl the change in i-cal GDP
(RDP) as a measure of the real return to real
capital. This variable also captures the effects of
changes in real output emphasized in the busi-
ness cycle literature. Because real output is close
to a random walk, changes in RGDP are a meas-
ure of unanticipated changes.
The change in RGDP has a significant effect
on the change in the real exchange rate. The
size of the coefficient is misleading because the
changes are in billions of dollars. A more sug-
gestive comparison is given by the change in
the real exchange rate induced by changes in
BGDP amid the defense spending rates during
four years of appreciation—1981—84. The total
appreciation of the real exchange rate for this
period is 44. The coefficients in the first column
of table 4 assign slightly less than half of this
change to the change in the defense spending
ratio and slightly more than half to the change
in RGDP. These calculations neglect other varia-
bles) particularly changes in motley and lags of
the real exchange rate. And the calculation
overstates the importance of supply shocks or
changes in tax rates because the changes in
RGDP include the recovery from the 1981—82
recession that would have occurred in the
absence of tax changes or supply shocks.
The response to deficit finance, measumed by
the change in real government debt, is small
and insignificant. A problem with testing for
effects of the budget deficit is the incomplete
and impnecise way in which the deficit is meas-
ured. Eisner and Pieper (1984) called attention
to this problem and showed that there are lam-ge
differences between current accounting mneas-
ures and measures of a more economically rele-
vant magnitude. Bohn (1992) computed a measure
of government net worth that includes principal
government assets and liabilities otherthan Social
Secun’ity and Medicare liabilities. The second
column substitutes the change in real govern-
ment net worth from Bohn for the change in
the real value of the federal debt as a measure
of the deficit. Govem-nment’s net worth is nega-
tive, and if proper-ly measured, the level of
goven-nmnent net worth is the value of future tax
payments. Changes in net worth have no signifi-
cant effect. ‘I’he responses to changes in R(DP
and changes in the defense spending share both
fall. Each explains a smaller fm-action of the
~2Ineglect possible changes in the properties of the error
term when taking first differences of equation (3).
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Figure4
Annual Changes in Real Exchange Rates
change in the real exchange rate during 1981 td)
1984 (and other periods). The implied change in
the real exchange rate resulting from changes
in Rc;L)p and the dlefense spending share at-c
miow approximately 25 percent and 29 percent
respectively -
Figure 4 shows predicted amid] actual changes
in the real exchange rate hasedl on the estimates
in the secondl column of table 4. Inspection sug-
gests that the equation explains the annual changes
more accum-atelv for the I 980s than for- the 1970s,
This is particularly true in 1974 amid 1975. There
are only three years in which actual andl pre-
dicted changes go in opposite dlimections—1975,
1978 and 1983 Actual amid predicted changes
move together during the appreciation and sub-
sequent depreciation of the dollar in the 1980s.
‘I’he equation suggests that contemporaneous
changes in momiey and in dlefense spending are
the primicipal factom-s keeping the predicted changes
in step with actual changes.
LIMITATIONS
The empirical results are subject to some hirni-
tations. This section briefly discusses some pro-
blenis arising froni the absence of a structural
niodel, neghect of simultaneity, and problems of
stationarity.
First, the estimates am-c obtained from a simnple
model of permanent and transitoi-y changes, not
froni a structur-al model. The edluations are niei-
ther structural edluatidimis nor reduced forms of
a stm-uctural model. An advantage of the model
is that it nests the effects of money and defense
spendling within a pdipular statistical model, the
random walk.
Second, several of the variables such as the
pt-ice level, output, the i-cal value of money and
the defense spemiding share are simultaneously
determined]. Simultaneity has been neglected
thm-oughout. The changes r-eported in table 4
amid the use of lagged lJrices removes some of
these problems. That the principal results are
unaffected suggests that simultaneity may not
impart serious bias to the estimates in table 3.
Third], many studlies dJf exchange rates have
investigated the stationaritv of exchange rates.
Tests of non-stationarity at fit-st seemed to sup-
port the hypothesis. Mom-c recent work using
loriget time series, however, casts dlouht on this
conclusion. Engel and Hamilton (1990) (lid] not
test for- stationarity, hut they found] persistent
197273 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
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departures fromn a random walk. Earlier, Krasker
(1980) coined the term peso problem for persist-
emit deviations of exchange rates mi a particular
dlirection. Papers by 1-luizinga (1987), llakkio and
Joines (1990), Lothian (1991), amid Diebold, hlustedh,
and Rush (1 991) are pam-t of the growing litem-
ature rejectinig non-stationarity based on evidience
that realexchange rates m-eturn to a mean value.
A main reason for- the differemices in findlings
between earlier arid later studies is the use of a
longer span of t’ears. Some eanhy studies usedl
daily or monthly data to obtain a larger number
of observations. Recent studies suggest that an
increased number- of highi-fn-equenicv observa-
tidJmis is a poor substitute for the relative paucity
of lou’-fm-equency data. n
‘i’he principal cdinclusion to draw from many
of the studies is that the real exchange rate is
subject to per-sistent amid tmamisitory changes.
Some changes iii the real exchange rate persist
for long periods. Some of the changes are re-
versed quickly. Diehold, Rusted, and Rush (1991)
comicludle that on average the half-life of a shock
to the real exchange rate has been about thm-ee
vean-s. This finding is sinnilan to the decay rates
implied by the coefficients on annual values of
the lagged real exchange rate mi table 3.
Inspection of figure 1 suggests that the mul-
tilatem-al real exchange rate remained within a
range of 95 ±15 froni 1973 to 1980 and
returned to approximately the same n-ange in
1987. To test for stationarity, I used] dpiarterhv
data for first quar-tem 197:3 to fourth dluarter
1990 but onntted the sharp appreciation andl
depreciation from third quarter 1980 to first
quarter 1987.14 ‘[lie coefficiemit of the lagged]
multilateral real exchange rate o ii the chiange in
the real exchange m-ate is -0.14 with a t-statistic
of 2.72. ‘the Dickev-Fuller test statistic is 2.93 at
the S pet-cent level a mid 2.60 at the 10 percent
level. On this basis, I reject non-stationarity.
(1(Ji\J(TLflSifTf%J
Miltdjn Friedmnan’s (1953) essay on flexible
exchange rates anticipated much dif the dliscus-
siomi and many of the controversies of the next
40 yeam-s. F’riedlnian dhid tiot claim that flexible
exchange rates would be stable rates. Stahilitv
depends on the size arid frequency of shocks,
Friedman claimed that flexible exchange mates
would (1) contribute to tradle hiherahizatiomi, (2)
avoidt reliamice on direct contnols, (3) facilitate
rearmament amid (4) allow countm’ies to follow
ddimiiestic policies to achieve price stability.
Sevem-al of these conjectures were correct.
Direct controls on capital mnovements have been
m-educed since 1973 in all developed countries
arid] imi some developing countties. It seems
likely that rearmamnemit (dlefense spending)
wouldh have provokedl gm-eaten- cdJnfhict about
payments imnbalances in the 1 980s undler fixed
exchange rates than under the ssteni that
prevailedl. Flexible rates permitted countries to
choose how much of the .stimnuhus emanating
from the United States they wished to absorb.
Many countries, indleedl most developed coun-
tries, both purchased mlollam- secum-ities andl
appreciated their currency.
The average rate of inflatiomi bias been
brought down under flexible rates, and somne
countries have achieved price stability at times.
‘i’r-ade restrictions, however, increased in the
1980s, particularly in the United States, amid the
movement toward trade liberalizatiomi slowed.
Friedlman did not argue that exchange rates
would] be stable. He argued that the path fol-
lowed by i-cal exchange rates would depemidl omi
the real and monetary dhisturhances to which
the economy is subject and] on the persistence of
shocks. Critics arguedl that destabilizing specula-
tion anml random movements domninate exchange
rate changes and create an excess burden. ‘I’his
burden, somne suggested, could he i-educed by
fixingexchange rates or establishing target zones.
‘I’he papem- dloes riot address the issue of
excess burden. I-however, I compare variability
of output amid] the terms of trade for four coumi-
tries under the Bretton Woodls System amid the
different reginies adlopted after 1973. There is
no evidence that real output is gemierally mom-c
variable under flexible exchange rates. Terms of
trade are more variable after 1973, but the data
do not suggest that the increased variability is
mnaimihv the result of the exchange rate regime.
Further, I compare levels and changes in real
exchange rates to the values predicted hiy a model.
“Hakkio and Rush (1991) reach the same conclusion based
on more format tests,
‘4The hypothesis implies and the data suggest that the ap-
preciation and depreciation in this period is mainly the
result of policy action.
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The forecast errors do not give evidence of
large, persistent errors. On the contrary, the
models call the turning points in the level and
changes in the exchange rate with considerable
accuracy. The data suggest, however, that there
is more unexplained variability of real exchange
rates after 1973 than before when measured by
the standard error of estimate for the regres-
sion equation.
The evidence also suggests that much of the
movement in both levels and changes in annual
values of the U.S. multilateral real exchange
rate is explained by permanent or persistent
changes in a few variables. The principal varia-
bles are real money balances and the share of
defense spending in GDP. When the change in
real balances is separated into variables measur-
ing the current change in nominal money and
the current change in theprice level, the data
suggest that the change in nominal money
(measured at past prices) has a more important
short-run effect. Quarterly data on levels of the
variablessupport the principal findings.
Monetary and fiscal variables are nested with-
in a random walk model of the real exchange
rate. Ifthe random-walk component dominated
the exchange rate, the data would reject the re-
levance of the monetary and fiscal variables.
The tests based on annual and quarterly data and
onannual changes support theopposite conclusion:
monetary and fiscal effects are persistent and
reliable, and their effect is contemporaneous—
within the current yearor quarter. Of course,
none of the findings here deny that the random
walk may dominate levels or changes of the ex-
change rate at higher frequencies.
Two principal observations about fluctuating
exchange rates during the past 20 years are:
(1) the close relation between real and nominal
exchange rates and (2) the sharp appreciation
and subsequent depreciation of the real dollar
exchange rate in the 1980s. I conjecture that
the principal reason for the correspondence
between movements in real and nominal ex-
change rates is that real exchange rates are
driven by contemporaneous permanent changes
in real variables, particularly real defense spend-
ing and real money balances, whereas nominal
exchange rates are driven by the nominal val-
ues of the same variables. Much of the short-
term effect of money on the real exchange rate
appears to be the result of changes in nominal
money, so it would not be surprising to find that
changes in nominal money balances have a sig-
nificant effect on the nominal exchange rate also.
DATA APPENDIX
Nominal eicchange rate (FNEW: Index of the
trade-weighted foreign exchange value of the
United States dollar compiled by the Federal
Reserve. The index is a geometric average of 10
industrialized countries’ dollar value of their
currencies weighted by their shares of world
trade between the years 1972 and 1976- The 10
countries are Germany, Japan, France, United
Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium,
Sweden and Switzerland.
Trade-weighted price level (TWCPV: Geometric
average of 10 industrialized countries’ consumer
price indexes weighted by their shares of total
world trade.
Real exchange rate: FNER deflated by the ratio of
the United States consumer price index (CPI) to
the 10 countries’ trade-weighted CPI.
Real money balances (ia): United States Ml
monetary aggregate deflated by the United
States CPI.
Defense spending share (4): Ratio of the United
States defense spending in current dollars to
GOP in current dollars.
Foreign money balances (TWNM): Arithmetic
average of indexes of M2 monetary aggregates
of Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan
(Ma & CD), weighted by their shares of total
world trade between the years 1972 and 1976.
Foreign real money balances: TWNM deflated by
TWCPI.
Real government net worth: Real government
deficit measuredby the US government real net
worth from Bohn (1992).
Relative price of oil: Oil price measured by com-
posite refiners’ acquisition cost deflated by GM’
deflator.
Realfederal debt: Gross federal debt net of Fed-
eral Reserve holdings deflated by the CPI.
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